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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






BARBARA ANNE ANDERSON,  




BONDEX INTERNATIONAL, INC. An Ohio Corporation; CBS CORPORATION, A 
Delaware Corporation (Successor By Merger With CBS Corporation F/K/A 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation)Formerly Known As Viacom Inc.; GEORGIA-
PACIFIC CORPORATION, A Georgia Corporation (Sued Individually And As 
Successor-In-Interest To Bestwall Gypsum Company); IMO INDUSTRIES, A Delaware 
Corporation (Sued Individually And As Successor-In-Interest To Delaval Sream Turbine 
Co.); INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY, A New Jersey Corporation (Sued Individually 
And As Successor-In-Interest Terry Steam Turbine Company); OWENS-ILLINOIS INC, 
A Delaware Corporation (Sued Individually And As Successor-In-Interest To Successor 
Owens-Illinois Glass Company); 
PHILIPS ELECTRONICIS NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION, A Delaware 
Corporation (Sued Individually And As Successor-In-Interest To And As Alter-Ego To 
Thompson-Hayward Chemical Co.); PRM, INC, A Delaware Corporation (Sued 
Individually And As Successor-In-Interest To Bondex International, Inc); T H 
AGRICULTURE & NUTRITION, LLC, A Delaware Corporation (Sued Individually 
And As Successor-In-Interest To Thompson-Hayward Chemical Co.); TYCO 
INTERNATIONAL (US), INC., A Massachusetts Corporation (Sued Individually And 
As Successor-In-Interest To Yarway Corporation); TYCO VALVES & CONTROLS 
INC., A Texas Corportion (Sued Individually And As Successor-In-Interest To Yarway 
Corporation); UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, A New York Corporation; 
YARWAY CORPORATION, A Delaware Corporation (Sued Individually And As 
Successor-In-Interest To Yarnall Warning Co.)
*
 
                                              
*
 Appellees Specialty Products Holding Corp. f/k/a RPM, Inc. and Bondex 
International, Inc. filed petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  
Accordingly, the appeal was stayed by Clerk Order on June 18, 2010 pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 362.  On October 12, 2010, we issued an order severing the case and lifting the 
stay as to Appellees Georgia-Pacific Corporation and Union Carbide Corporation.  The 





On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-07-cv-63839) 
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
___________                         
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Before:  JORDAN, VANASKIE, Circuit Judges, and  
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*
, Senior District Judge. 
 
(Filed: January 7, 2014) 





VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Barbara Anderson appeals from an order of the District Court finding that her 
proposed amended complaint did not relate back to her original pleading.  Because we 
agree with the District Court that the two pleadings did not arise out of the same 
“conduct, transaction, or occurrence,” as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B), we will 
affirm. 
I. 
On August 16, 2006, Barbara Anderson was diagnosed with mesothelioma.  She 
filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond on October 26, 2006, 
alleging that her mesothelioma was caused by exposure to “asbestos dust and fibers from 
                                              
*
 The Honorable Jed. S. Rakoff, United States Senior District Judge for the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 
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[her father’s] asbestos-laden workclothes.”  (Appendix (“A.”) 60.)  Anderson’s father 
worked as a pipe cover insulator at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.  Anderson argued that 
she was exposed to asbestos from 1947, when her father began working at the Shipyard, 
until 1956.  Anderson named more than twenty defendants, including Georgia-Pacific 
Corporation (“Georgia-Pacific”), and Union Carbide Corporation (“Union Carbide”) 
(collectively, “Appellees”), alleging she was entitled to recover under theories of 
negligence and breach of warranty.  Hoping to avoid removal to federal court, Anderson 
also “disclaim[ed] any cause of action for any injuries caused by any exposure to asbestos 
dust that occurred in a federal enclave.”  (A. 65 ¶ 10.) 
At the time she filed her original complaint, Anderson believed her only exposure 
to asbestos occurred from 1947 to 1956, when she lived with her father while he was 
working at the Naval Shipyard.  When Anderson was subsequently deposed in January 
2007, however, she testified that she believed she was also exposed to asbestos dust in 
Federal office buildings where she worked during the 1960s and ‘70s.   
Based on Anderson’s deposition testimony, Georgia-Pacific filed a notice of 
removal, explaining that Anderson alleged asbestos exposure during her employment in 
buildings located within federal enclaves, and that, as such, the action was removable 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.  The case proceeded in federal court as part of the asbestos 
Multidistrict Litigation in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and Magistrate Judge 
David Strawbridge oversaw the pretrial proceedings.   
On May 21, 2009, several defendants filed motions for summary judgment.  On 
June 10, 2009, Anderson filed a motion to amend her original complaint.  In addition to 
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removing the federal enclave disclaimer, her proposed amended complaint alleged that 
she “was exposed to dust from asbestos-containing joint compound products during 
ongoing construction and renovation projects taking place in the office buildings where 
she worked” during the 1960s and ‘70s.  (A. 578 ¶ 1.)  Her amended complaint did not 
include the allegations of household asbestos exposure during her childhood. 
The Magistrate Judge denied Anderson’s motion for leave to amend, finding that 
the proposed amended complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and 
did not relate back to her original complaint because it alleged a subsequent phase of 
asbestos exposure.  Anderson filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s order, which the 
District Court overruled.  
Anderson now appeals the District Court’s order overruling her objections, 
arguing the District Court erred in finding that her amended complaint does not relate 
back to her original pleading.  Specifically, she argues the District Court erroneously 
applied a standard for relation back that is limited to habeas corpus proceedings, and 
erred in finding that notice to defendants of an amended claim must come from the 
original complaint. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s interpretation and application of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Glover v. FDIC, 698 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2012).  However, we review a 
district court’s factual conclusions as to a motion to amend for clear error, Singletary v. 
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Pa. Dep’t of Corrections, 266 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001), and its decision to grant or 
deny a motion to amend for abuse of discretion.  Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 
244, 252 (3d Cir. 2008). 
A.  
Anderson first argues that the District Court misapplied Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15, which governs amended pleadings, by employing the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005).  She contends that Mayle established an 
exacting test for relation back that should be limited to federal habeas corpus 
proceedings.
1
   
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides, in the context relevant here, that “a 
party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the 
court’s leave.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).  Rule 15 counsels courts to “freely give leave [to 
amend] when justice so requires.”  Id.  However, “undue delay, bad faith, and futility” 
justify a court’s denial of leave to amend, Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d 
Cir. 2006), and amendment of a complaint is “futile” if “that claim would not be able to 
overcome the statute of limitations.”  Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 296 (3d Cir. 
                                              
1
 Appellees contend Anderson waived this argument because she failed to raise it 
before the District Court.  While they concede that Anderson presented a version of the 
argument in footnote three of her Brief in Support of Her Objections, see (A. 727), 
Appellees argue this was merely “[a] fleeting reference or vague allusion” that failed to 
“present[] the argument with sufficient specificity to alert the district court.”  In re Ins. 
Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, 579 F.3d 241, 262 (3d Cir. 2009).  We disagree.  
Anderson’s explicit presentation of the issue was sufficient to preserve it for our review.  
See id. (holding “explicit mention” and “brief discussion” of issues sufficient to preserve 
for appellate review). 
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2001).  Where a claim is barred by the statute of limitations, amendment is only 
permitted if the proposed amended complaint “relates back to the date of the original 
pleading” pursuant to Rule 15(c). 
 Here, it is undisputed that Anderson’s claims are governed by Virginia’s two-year 
statute of limitations.  See Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-243 and 8.01-249(4).  It is also 
undisputed that, unless the amended complaint relates back to her original complaint, 
Anderson’s claims are time-barred.2  
Rule 15(c) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates 
back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim or 
defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to 
be set out--in the original pleading.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).3  We have interpreted 
                                              
2
 Virginia law requires personal injury claims to “be brought within two years 
after the cause of action accrues.”  Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243.  In cases alleging injury as 
a result of asbestos exposure, the cause of action accrues “when a diagnosis of asbestosis, 
interstitial fibrosis, mesothelioma, or other disabling asbestos-related injury or disease is 
first communicated to the person or his agent by a physician.”  Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-
249(4).  Anderson was diagnosed with mesothelioma on August 16, 2006.  Thus, the 
statute of limitations period expired on August 16, 2008.  Anderson did not move for 
leave to amend her complaint until June 10, 2009, nearly ten months after the statute of 
limitations had run. 
3
 The full text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1) provides: 
(1) When an Amendment Relates Back.  An amendment to a 
pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading 
when: 
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of 
limitations allows relation back; 
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose 
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or 
attempted to be set out-- in the original pleading; or 
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Rule 15(c) as requiring “a common core of operative facts in the two pleadings.”  Bensel 
v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 387 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2004).  Accordingly, proposed 
amendments relate back if they “restate the original claim with greater particularity or 
amplify the factual circumstances surrounding the pertinent conduct, transaction or 
occurrence in the preceding pleading.”  Id.   
Interpreting Rule 15(c)’s application to petitions for habeas corpus, the Supreme 
Court held that “[a]n amended habeas petition . . . does not relate back . . . when it asserts 
a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those the 
original pleading set forth.”  Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650.  The Magistrate Judge quoted this 
language in its Memorandum Opinion, noting that, although the Court decided Mayle in 
the context of habeas corpus, the principle “applies equally here” because Mayle was 
predicated on the relevant subsection of Rule 15(c).  (A. 7.)  The District Court adopted 
                                                                                                                                                  
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the 
party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 
15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided 
by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the 
party to be brought in by amendment: 
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be 
prejudiced in defending on the merits; and 
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would 
have been brought against it, but for a mistake 
concerning the proper party’s identity. 
 
Here, neither party asserts that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C) applies.  The parties also agree 
that section 15(c)(1)(A) is immaterial because it gives a party the benefit of whichever 
standard for relation back is most lenient, and that the federal rule is “either equivalent to 
or more lenient than its Virginia equivalent, Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-6.1.”  (Appellant’s Br. 




the reasoning of the Magistrate Judge, but did not reference the “time and type” language 
from Mayle.  Instead, the District Court merely cited that case for the general “common 
core of operative fact” test. 
Nevertheless, Anderson argues the District Court erred in applying the standard 
expounded in Mayle, which, she asserts, is more stringent than the standard for ordinary 
civil cases.  She urges that the proper inquiry is set out in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. 
Co., 323 U.S. 574 (1945), where the Supreme Court held that an amended complaint 
related back even though it added a new claim.  In Tiller, a widow brought suit against a 
railroad company after her husband was struck and killed by a railroad car.  The original 
complaint in Tiller alleged negligence for failure to provide a lookout who could warn of 
coming trains, and the amended complaint alleged negligence for failure to properly light 
the railroad car.  Id. at 580.  Asserting that, under Tiller, relation back is proper even if 
the amended pleading alters the “mode in which the defendant breached the legal duty or 
caused the injury,” (Appellant’s Br. 27 (citing Davis v. Yellow Cab Co., 35 F.R.D. 159, 
161 (E.D. Pa. 1964)), Anderson argues her amended complaint relates back under this 
standard. 
We are not persuaded.  First, we note that the District Court did not rely on the 
Mayle “time and type” language, but instead applied the long-standing test for relation 
back, which analyzes whether the amended complaint shares a “common core of 
operative fact” with the original pleading.  Bensel, 387 F.3d at 310.   
Second, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Mayle was consistent with – not more 
exacting than – its application of Rule 15(c) in other contexts.  Mayle, 545 U.S. at 664 
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(“Our reading is consistent with the general application of Rule 15(c)(2).”).  Indeed, 
rather than holding that Rule 15(c) should be applied more rigorously in the habeas 
context, the Supreme Court explained that it was reining in what it saw as the lower 
courts’ more liberal construction of Rule 15(c) in habeas cases than in “run-of-the-mine 
civil proceedings.”  Id. at 657.  Thus, we have utilized Mayle’s “time and type” language 
in the non-habeas civil context.  See Glover, 698 F.3d at 147 (“In other words, 
[Appellant’s] amended FDCPA claims differed in ‘time and type’ from the claims earlier 
alleged.”) (citing Mayle, 545 U.S. at 657-59). 
Furthermore, Anderson does not meet the general standards for relation back as set 
forth in Tiller or Bensel.  Relation back under Rule 15(c) requires an amended complaint 
to share a “common core of operative facts” with the original pleading.  Bensel, 387 F.3d 
at 310.  Although Anderson characterizes her proposed amendment as merely “alter[ing] 
the mode by which defendants caused the injury,” (Appellant’s Br. 17), her amended 
complaint alleges entirely separate exposure years later while she herself was working.  
We therefore agree with the District Court that “[t]he only thing that the two complaints 
have in common is [Anderson] herself, and the unfortunate fact that she may have been 
exposed to asbestos twice in her life, under unrelated circumstances.”  (A. 22.)  Thus, we 
conclude that the District Court properly interpreted and applied Rule 15(c). 
B. 
 Anderson next argues that she meets the requirements for relation back because 
the defendants in this case had actual notice of her intent to pursue a claim based on her 
workplace exposure to asbestos in the 1960s and ‘70s.  Specifically, she asserts that the 
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District Court erred in finding that notice must come from the original pleading, and in 
finding that her original complaint failed to put defendants on notice of her amended 
claim.   
 We have explained that fair notice is “the touchstone for relation back . . . because 
Rule 15(c) is premised on the theory that ‘a party who has been notified of litigation 
concerning  a particular occurrence has been given all the notice that statutes of 
limitations were intended to provide.’”  Glover, 698 F.3d at 146 (quoting Baldwin Cty. 
Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149 n.3 (1984)).  Our precedent states 
unequivocally, however, that an amendment does not relate back “where the original 
pleading does not give a defendant ‘fair notice of what the plaintiff’s [amended] claim is 
and the grounds up on which it rests.’”  Glover, 698 F.3d at 146 (quoting Baldwin, 466 
U.S. at 149 n.3) (emphasis added).  We therefore reject Anderson’s argument that notice 
need not come from the original pleading.  
 We likewise reject Anderson’s contention that her original complaint put 
Appellees on notice of her amended claim. The original complaint made no mention of 
workplace exposure during the 1960s and ‘70s, and in fact explicitly disclaimed any 
cause of action related to her employment within federal enclaves.   
 Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that Anderson was required to 
provide fair notice in her original pleading of asbestos exposure in the workplace, and 
that she failed to do so.  Thus, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
